Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):263 - 282 (1989)
|Abstract||Bruno de Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability are reviewed. These include the notion of exchangeability and the theory of random processes with independent increments. The latter theory relates to de Finetti's ideas for a probabilistic science more generally. Different aspects of his work are united by his foundational programme for a theory of subjective probabilities.|
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