Online research in philosophy

What makes a substance the same substance as an earlier substance is that its matter is the same, or obtained from the matter of the former substance by gradual replacement, while continuing to possess the essential properties which constitute its form. (Swinburne, pp. 318-319).

Presents an interpretation of Brentano's theory of categories, and more specifically of Brentano's view according to which space is the single substance of which all other entities are accidents or tropes. In the appendix to his Theory of Categories Brentano puts forward an even more radical suggestion, inspired by the physics of Kelvin. According to this final view, space itself is an accident of a deeper substance: the present time.

The categorial concepts of substance (thing) and substance (stuff) are described, and the conceptual relationships between things and their constitutive stuff delineated. The relationship between substance concepts, expressed by other count-nouns, and natural kind concepts is examined. Artefacts and their parts are argued to be substances, whereas parts of organisms are not. The confusions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers who invoked the concept of substance are adumbrated.

Descartes claims that God is a substance, and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible. For Descartes, that something is real means it can exist in separation, and something is a substance if it does not depend on other substances for its existence. Further, separable objects are correlates of distinct ideas, for an idea is distinct (in an objective sense) if its object may be easily and clearly separated from everything that is not its object. It follows that if our idea of God is our most distinct idea, as Descartes claims, then God must be a substance in the Cartesian sense of the term. Also, if we can have an idea of a thinking subject which does not in any sense refer to bodily things, and if bodily things are substances, then mind and body must be two different substances.

In a pragmatic approach to ontology, what is necessary and sufficient for the dispositional causation of events is interpreted realistically, and postulated to exist. This leads to a concept of `generic substance' (Aristotle's underlying `matter') as being constituted by dispositions, not just being the `bare subject' for those dispositions. If we describe the forms of objects according their spatiotemporal range, then this form is best viewed as a field, and substances themselves are best conceived as `fields of propensity'.

Process philosophy endeavors to replace the classical ontology of substances by a process ontology centered on the notions of change and transition. We argue that the substantial and processual approach are mutually complementary in the sense of a generalized quantum theory which is not limited to physical phenomena. From this point of view, restricting oneself to either substance ontology or process ontology would be as ill-advised as exclusively relying on position or momentum representations in physics. A new view on Zeno's paradox lends itself. The meaning of a 'mental energy' observable, complementary to 'internal time', and its relationship to acategorial states of the human mind will be tentatively discussed.

In this paper, I put forward some remarks supporting a reading of Spinoza's metaphysics in terms of process ontology, that is, the notion that processes or activities, rather than things, are the most basic entities. I suggest that this reading, while not the only possible one, offers advantages over the traditional substance-properties interpretation. While this claim may sound implausible vis-à-vis Spinoza's language of ‘substance’ and ‘attributes’, I show that process ontology illuminates important features of Spinoza's thought and can facilitate solutions to some interpretive problems.

Appropriate philosophical language for describing the nature of God took almost two millennia to develop. Parmenides first discovered the language of being. Plato then distinguished the world of changing beings from the world of true being and also from the good “beyond being.” He refused to use being language for the Olympic gods. Aristotle understood a god as a substance (oujsiva). Avicenna described God, not as a substance but as “being,” which transcends thecategories, including substance. For Br. Thomas of Aquino, God was no longer an Aristotelian substance, nor even an Avicennian “necessary being,” but is bestdescribed as “subsistent being itself ” (ipsum esse subsistens). Here the Christian disciple brought to an even higher level of perfection the achievements of his Islamic master, achievements that far surpassed their beginnings in Parmenidean monism.

Definitions Axioms Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common Prop III. Things, which have nothing in common, cannot be one the cause of the other Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substance, or by the differences of their modifications Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not constrained by anyone Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute Prop..

divinity in reference to substance or in some other way; and I judge that a path of inquiry should be taken from that place which is agreed to be the clear starting point of all affairs, that is from the very foundations of the catholic faith. So, if I should ask whether He who is called Father is a substance, the response would be that He is a substance. But if I should ask whether the Son is a substance, the response would be the same. And no one..