David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):351-383 (2010)
It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must
|Keywords||Modality Epistemic Evidentiality|
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References found in this work BETA
Christopher Potts (2005). The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford University Press Uk.
Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
John Lyons (1977). Semantics. Cambridge University Press.
Angelika Kratzer (1977). What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
Citations of this work BETA
Ezra Cook (2013). Epistemic Modals and Common Ground. Inquiry 56 (2-3):179-209.
Malte Willer (forthcoming). An Update on Epistemic Modals. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
Eric Swanson (2008). Modality in Language. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1193-1207.
Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2015). Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
Jennifer Nagel (2015). The Social Value of Reasoning in Epistemic Justification. Episteme 12 (2):297-308.
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