Straightening priority out

Philosophical Studies 161 (3):391-401 (2012)
In recent work, Louis deRosset (Philosophical Studies 149:73–97, 2010) has argued that priority theorists, who hold that truths about macroscopic objects can be metaphysically explained without reference to such things, cannot meet an independently motivated constraint upon good explanation. By clarifying the nature of the priority theorist’s project, I argue that deRosset’s argument fails to establish its conclusion.
Keywords Priority  Fundamentality  Metaphysical explanation  Truthmaking
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9745-y
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References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-30.
Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73 - 97.

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Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73 - 97.
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.

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