David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 18 (4):427-439 (2003)
Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations 'do not earn their explanatory keep'. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or nonconnectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved.
|Keywords||Connectionism Explanation Mental Representation Science Truth|
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Robert C. Cummins (1975). Functional Analysis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
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