In Alexander Battyany & E. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter (2009)
|Abstract||Materialists who do not deny the existence of mental phenomena usually claim that the mental supervenes on the physical, i.e. that there cannot be a change in the mental life of a man without there being a change in the man's body. This modal claim is usually understood in terms of logical necessity. I argue that this is a mistake, resulting from assumptions inherited from logical empiricism, and that it should be understood in terms of synthetic necessity.|
|Keywords||supervenience modality materialism|
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