David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:113-132 (1981)
Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent
|Keywords||Agency Causality Free Will Metaphysics Reductionism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Abbas J. Ali, Robert C. Camp & Manton Gibbs (2005). The Concept of “Free Agency” in Monotheistic Religions: Implications for Global Business. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 60 (1):103 - 112.
Markus E. Schlosser (2007). The Metaphysics of Agency. Dissertation, St. Andrews
Roy Wood Sellars (1957). Guided Causality, Using Reason, and Free-Will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (August):485-492.
Carissa Véliz (2011). Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? Rethinking Causal Directions Between Neural Mechanisms, Agency, and Human Enhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (3):46-48.
Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff (2003). Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.
Paul Benson (1990). Feminist Second Thoughts About Free Agency. Hypatia 5 (3):47 - 64.
Robert H. Kane (2005). Free Agency and Laws of Nature. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):46-53.
Christian Sachse (2007). What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #216,714 of 1,906,985 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #345,104 of 1,906,985 )
How can I increase my downloads?