Measurement and the verificationist theory/observation distinction

Acta Analytica 19 (33):95-117 (2004)
In the following article, we propose to show that following the general verificationist epistemic programme (its demand that the truth of our judgments be verifiable), the analysis of measurement on the one hand, and the classical positivist analysis of common-sense observation on the other, do not lead to same conclusions. This is especially important, because the differences in conclusions concern the positivist theory/observation distinction. In particular, the analysis of measurement does not fully support this distinction. This fact might have important consequences for the problem of scientific realism and related ontological and epistemological problems in the philosophy of science.
Keywords Verificationism  Measurement  B. Ellis  Theory/Observation distinction
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