Data meet theory: up close and inferentially personal

Synthese 182 (1):89 - 100 (2011)
Abstract
In a recent paper James Bogen and James Woodward denounce a set of views on confirmation that they collectively brand 'IRS'. The supporters of these views cast confirmation in terms of Inferential Relations between observational and theoretical Sentences. Against 1RS accounts of confirmation, Bogen and Woodward unveil two main objections: (a) inferential relations are not necessary to model confirmation relations since many data are neither in sentential form nor can they be put in such a form and (b) inferential relations are not sufficient to model confirmation relations because the former cannot capture evidentially relevant factors about the detection processes and instruments that generate the data. In this paper I have a two-fold aim: (i) to show that Bogen and Woodward fail to provide compelling grounds for the rejection of IRS models and (ii) to highlight some of the models' neglected merits
Keywords Data  Phenomena  Confirmation  Inferences  Bogen  Woodward
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Allan Franklin (1994). How to Avoid the Experimenters' Regress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):463-491.
    Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.

    View all 9 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Ioannis Votsis (2014). Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:70-78.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-04-24

    Total downloads

    22 ( #65,924 of 1,088,404 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,404 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.