David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 182 (1):89 - 100 (2011)
In a recent paper James Bogen and James Woodward denounce a set of views on confirmation that they collectively brand 'IRS'. The supporters of these views cast confirmation in terms of Inferential Relations between observational and theoretical Sentences. Against 1RS accounts of confirmation, Bogen and Woodward unveil two main objections: (a) inferential relations are not necessary to model confirmation relations since many data are neither in sentential form nor can they be put in such a form and (b) inferential relations are not sufficient to model confirmation relations because the former cannot capture evidentially relevant factors about the detection processes and instruments that generate the data. In this paper I have a two-fold aim: (i) to show that Bogen and Woodward fail to provide compelling grounds for the rejection of IRS models and (ii) to highlight some of the models' neglected merits
|Keywords||Data Phenomena Confirmation Inferences Bogen Woodward|
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References found in this work BETA
James Bogen & James Woodward (1988). Saving the Phenomena. Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.
Jim Bogen & Jim Woodward (1992). Observations, Theories and the Evolution of the Human Spirit. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):590-611.
Allan Franklin (1994). How to Avoid the Experimenters' Regress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):463-491.
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Carl G. Hempel (1943). A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):122-143.
Citations of this work BETA
Ioannis Votsis (2014). Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):70-78.
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