Ioannisvotsis
| Abstract | 1. 'Data Meet Theories: Up Close and Personal' - In this talk I extend my critique of Bogen and Woodward's claim that we do not (and perhaps cannot) use theories to infer, predict or explain observations. I do so by demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of novel prediction could not have been made unless the relationship between data and theories is more direct than Bogen and woodward would have us believe. (To be presented at the conference Data - Phenomena - Theories: What's the notion of a scientific phenomenon good for?, University of Heidelberg , September 11-13 2008). | |||||||||
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Benedikt Löwe & Thomas Müller (2011). Data and Phenomena in Conceptual Modelling. Synthese 182 (1):131-148.
Peter Machamer (2011). Phenomena, Data and Theories: A Special Issue of Synthese. Synthese 182 (1):1-5.
James F. Woodward (2011). Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and Defense. Synthese 182 (1):165-179.
Ioannis Votsis (2011). Data Meet Theory: Up Close and Inferentially Personal. Synthese 182 (1):89-100.
James W. McAllister (1997). Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets. Erkenntnis 47 (2):217-228.
Bruce Glymour (2000). Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. Erkenntnis 52 (1):29-37.
Jochen Apel (2011). On the Meaning and the Epistemological Relevance of the Notion of a Scientific Phenomenon. Synthese 182 (1):23-38.
Ioannis Votsis (forthcoming). Making Contact with Observations. EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences, , vol. 2..
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