Is structure not enough?
Philosophy of Science 70 (5):879-890 (2003)
| Abstract | This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell’s lesser-known epistemological views, viz. ‘‘structural realism’’ (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman’s allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uninformative. Moreover, appealing to Quine’s notion of ontological relativity, I suggest that far from being false, SR knowledge claims seem to be the most that we can hope for. | |||||||||
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Brian Skyrms (1996). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.
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Jennifer Nagel (2006). Empiricism. In Sarkar Pfeifer (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
Ioannis Votsis (forthcoming). Structural Realism: Continuity and its Limits. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science.
Stathis Psillos (2006). The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure? Philosophy of Science 73 (5):560-570.
Stathis Psillos (2006). The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure? Philosophy of Science 73 (5):560-570.
Zanja Yudell (2010). Melia and Saatsi on Structural Realism. Synthese 175 (2):241-253.
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