The epistemological status of scientific theories: An investigation of the structural realist account
| Abstract | In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
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