David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1223-1234 (2011)
Scientific realists endeavour to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that despite the demise of empirically successful theories the parts of those theories responsible for their success do in fact survive theory change. If, as some anti-realists have recently suggested, those parts of theories that are responsible for their success are only identifiable in retrospect, namely as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialised for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The aim of this paper is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival
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References found in this work BETA
Bas C. van Fraassen (2006). Structure: Its Shadow and Substance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):275-307.
Hasok Chang (2003). Preservative Realism and its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):902-912.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Vickers (2013). A Confrontation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 80 (2):189-211.
Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
Matthias Egg (2014). Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):axu025.
Matthias Egg (2016). Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):115-141.
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