Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution

Abstract
According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption Attempts to defend the disputed assumption Attempts to refute the disputed assumption A way out for Bayesians Conclusion.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,248
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Robert J. Levy (1988). Regarding the Raven Paradox. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:17 - 23.
Michael Strevens (2001). The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
Mark Siebel (2004). Der Rabe Und der Bayesianist. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):313 - 329.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

65 ( #35,579 of 1,700,233 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

34 ( #17,385 of 1,700,233 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.