In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan (2011)
|Abstract||This paper argues that the recent metaethical turn to reasons as the fundamental units of normativity offers no special advantage in explaining a variety of other normative and evaluative phenomena, unless perhaps a form of reductionism about reasons is adopted which is rejected by many of those who advocate turning to reasons.|
|Keywords||Reasons Value Explanation|
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