Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511 (2008)
|Abstract||The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Philip Stratton-Lake (1999). Why Externalism is Not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90.
Thomas Carson (2004). Philip Stratton‐Lake, Ed., Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations:Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations. Ethics 115 (1):175-177.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
Nicholas L. Sturgeon (2002). Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism. In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford University Press.
Elizabeth Tropman (2011). Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge. Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.
Mary-Lou Galician & Steve Pasternack (1987). Balancing Good News and Bad News: An Ethical Obligation? Journal of Mass Media Ethics 2 (2):82 – 92.
Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads140 ( #3,099 of 556,788 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #9,636 of 556,788 )
How can I increase my downloads?