Thick Concepts: Where's Evaluation?

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press 235-70 (2012)
This paper presents an alternative to the standard view that the evaluations that the so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics may be used to convey belong to their sense or semantic meaning. I describe a large variety of linguistic data that are well explained by the alternative view that the evaluations that (at least a very wide range of) thick terms and concepts may be used to convey are a certain kind of defeasible implications of their utterances which can be given a conversational explanation. I then provide some reasons to think that this explanation of the data is superior to the standard view, but a fuller assessment must await further work. In closing I briefly survey the largely deflationary consequences of this account regarding the significance of thick terms and concepts for evaluative thought and judgment.
Keywords moral semantics  thick concepts  pragmatics
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Debbie Roberts (2013). Thick Concepts. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.

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