David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (1):73-87 (2008)
In order to design and implement electronic institutions that incorporate norms governing the behavior of the participants of those institutions, some crucial steps should be taken. The first problem is that human norms are (on purpose) specified on an abstract level. This ensures applicability of the norms over long periods of time in many different circumstances. However, for an electronic institution to function according to those norms, they should be concrete enough to be able to check them run time. A second problem is that norms describe which behavior is desirable and permitted, but not how this is achieved in an institution. In the “real world" regulations often indicate procedures for implementing and enforcing the law. Likewise we should devise means to annotate the norms with practical aspects such as enforcement mechanisms, sanctions, etc. in order to get requirements for an institution that will enforce norms (by either constraining behavior within the norms or reacting to violation of the norms). The choice of which kind of mechanism is chosen is not a normative one, but usually based on criteria of efficiency and/or feasibility of the mechanism. In this paper we present our view on how to approach these problems and other related issues to be solved in order to develop e-institutions capable to operate in complex, highly regulated scenarios.
|Keywords||Multi agent systems Electronic institutions Norms Norm enforcement|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
Russell Hardin (2008). Norms and Games. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):843-849.
Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (2010). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese 176 (1):105 - 123.
Frank Dignum (1999). Autonomous Agents with Norms. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (1):69-79.
Chandra Sripada & Stephen Stich (2006). A Framework for the Psychology of Norms. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
Kristin Andrews (2009). Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind. Inquiry 52 (5):433-448.
Henrique Lopes Cardoso & Eugénio Oliveira (2008). Electronic Institutions for B2b: Dynamic Normative Environments. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (1):107 - 128.
Sergei Gepshtein (2009). Closing the Gap Between Ideal and Real Behavior: Scientific Vs. Engineering Approaches to Normativity. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):61 – 75.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #350,573 of 1,101,623 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #178,427 of 1,101,623 )
How can I increase my downloads?