David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 53 (3):354-371 (1986)
Realism about progress--that progress consists in the obtaining of some metaphysical relation between a sequence of theories and the world--is often thought to be required by realism about the representational character of theories. The purpose of this paper is to show how one can be a realist about theories without being a realist about progress. The result is a view that cannot be at odds with what the history of science shows
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alan Musgrave (1992). Realism About What? Philosophy of Science 59 (4):691-697.
Paul M. Quay (1974). Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the Sciences. Philosophy of Science 41 (2):154-170.
Alexander Bird (2008). Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.
Eric Dietrich (2011). There Is No Progress in Philosophy. Essays in Philosophy 12 (2):9.
Catherine Wilson (2011). Moral Progress Without Moral Realism. Philosophical Papers 39 (1):97-116.
Leslie Sklair (1968). Gomte and the Idea of Progress. Inquiry 11 (1-4):321 – 331.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). N-Rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):277-278.
Peter Smith (1981). Realism and the Progress of Science. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #195,487 of 1,005,066 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,743 of 1,005,066 )
How can I increase my downloads?