|Abstract||A decision problem in which the values of the decision variables must sum to a fixed positive real number s is called an "allocation problem," and the problem of aggregating the allocations of n experts the "allocation aggregation problem." Under two simple axiomatic restrictions on aggregation, the only acceptable allocation aggregation method is based on weighted arithmetic averaging (Lehrer and Wagner, Rational Consensus in Science and Society, 1981). In this note it is demonstrated that when the values assigned to the variables are restricted to a finite set (as is always the case in practice), the aforementioned axioms allow only dictatorial aggregation.|
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