Old evidence and new explanation
Philosophy of Science 64 (4):677-691 (1997)
| Abstract | Jeffrey has devised a probability revision method that increases the probability of hypothesis H when it is discovered that H implies previously known evidence E. A natural extension of Jeffrey's method likewise increases the probability of H when E has been established with sufficiently high probability and it is then discovered, quite apart from this, that H confers sufficiently higher probability on E than does its logical negation H̄ | |||||||||
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