Synaesthesia misrepresented

Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):347-351 (2001)
Abstract
Gray argues that my three earlier counterexamples fail to refute representational theories of phenomenal character. I maintain that, despite Gray's arguments, each example does in fact work against the particular representational theory at which it is targeted. Further, I question whether my internalism regarding phenomenal character and Gray's externalism regarding modularity are in genuine conflict with one another
Keywords Psychiatry  Science  Synaesthesia  Gray, R
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