David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621–654 (1999)
It is both common and natural to think of addiction as a kind of defect of the will. Addicts, we tend to suppose, are subject to impulses or cravings that are peculiarly unresponsive to their evaluative reflection about what there is reason for them to do. As a result of this unresponsiveness, we further suppose, addicts are typically impaired in their ability to act in accordance with their own deliberative conclusions. My question in this paper is whether we can make adequate sense of this conception of addiction as a volitional defect. In particular, I want to focus on some philosophical assumptions, from the theory of action, that bear directly on the very idea that addiction might impair the agent’s volitional capacities. Understanding this idea, I shall argue, requires that we start out with an adequate conception of the human will. Only if we appreciate the kinds of volitional capacities characteristic of normal agents can we conceptualize properly the impairment of those capacities represented by addiction, and assess the implications of such impairment for questions of responsibility.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Derek Baker (2012). Knowing Yourself—And Giving Up On Your Own Agency In The Process. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):641 - 656.
Edmund Henden (2008). What is Self-Control? Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.
Gerben Meynen (2010). Free Will and Mental Disorder: Exploring the Relationship. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2013). A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.
Similar books and articles
Eric Matthews (2010). Explaining Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):23-26.
A. M. Viens (2007). Addiction, Responsibility and Moral Psychology. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):17 – 19.
Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2006). Addiction and Autonomy: Can Addicted People Consent to the Prescription of Their Drug of Addiction? Bioethics 20 (1):1–15.
Jennifer A. Parks (1999). Ethical Androcentrism and Maternal Substance Addiction. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (2):165-175.
Peter J. Cohen (2002). Untreated Addiction Imposes an Ethical Bar to Recruiting Addicts for Non-Therapeutic Studies of Addictive Drugs. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 30 (1):73-81.
Jann E. Schlimme (2010). Addiction and Self-Determination: A Phenomenological Approach. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):49-62.
Bennett Foddy (2011). Addicted to Food, Hungry for Drugs. Neuroethics 4 (2):79-89.
Helen Keane (2004). Disorders of Desire: Addiction and Problems of Intimacy. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 25 (3):189-204.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads159 ( #5,488 of 1,140,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #16,869 of 1,140,037 )
How can I increase my downloads?