Addiction as defect of the will: Some philosophical reflections [Book Review]

Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621–654 (1999)
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Abstract

It is both common and natural to think of addiction as a kind of defect of the will. Addicts, we tend to suppose, are subject to impulses or cravings that are peculiarly unresponsive to their evaluative reflection about what there is reason for them to do. As a result of this unresponsiveness, we further suppose, addicts are typically impaired in their ability to act in accordance with their own deliberative conclusions. My question in this paper is whether we can make adequate sense of this conception of addiction as a volitional defect. In particular, I want to focus on some philosophical assumptions, from the theory of action, that bear directly on the very idea that addiction might impair the agent’s volitional capacities. Understanding this idea, I shall argue, requires that we start out with an adequate conception of the human will. Only if we appreciate the kinds of volitional capacities characteristic of normal agents can we conceptualize properly the impairment of those capacities represented by addiction, and assess the implications of such impairment for questions of responsibility.

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R. Jay Wallace
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

The atoms of self‐control.Chandra Sripada - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):800-824.
Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.
What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.

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References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Freedom in belief and desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.
A research-based theory of addictive motivation.George Ainslie - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (1):77-115.

View all 7 references / Add more references