A Moorean paradox of desire

Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84 (2012)
Abstract
Moore's paradox is a paradox in which certain kinds of belief or assertion, such as a belief that ?it is raining and I do not believe that it is raining?, are irrational despite involving no obvious contradiction in what is believed. But is there a parallel paradox involving other kinds of attitude, in particular desire? I argue that certain kinds of desire would be irrational to have for similar, distinctive reasons that having Moorean beliefs would be irrational to have. Hence, I argue that such desires, a desire that ?one have a particular desire that was frustrated? or a desire that ?some state of affairs obtain about which one was indifferent?, are a parallel Moorean paradox of desire. I further argue that this analogous paradox has implications for practical reasoning, in particular by presenting a problem for instrumentalism about the objects of desire
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    References found in this work BETA
    Michael Dummett (1993). What is Mathematics About? In Alexander George (ed.), The Seas of Language. Oxford University Press. 429--445.
    Jordi Fernandez (2007). Desire and Self-Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517-536.
    Jordi Fernandez (2007). Desire and Self-Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.

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