Begging the question as a pragmatic fallacy
Synthese 100 (1):95 - 131 (1994)
| Abstract | The aim of this paper is to make it clear how and why begging the question should be seen as a pragmatic fallacy which can only be properly evaluated in a context of dialogue. Included in the paper is a review of the contemporary literature on begging the question that shows the gradual emergence over the past twenty years or so of the dialectical conception of this fallacy. A second aim of the paper is to investigate a number of general problems raised by the pragmatic framework. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesBrian Weatherson (1999). Begging the Question and Bayesians. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:687-697.
Scott A. Shalkowski (2001). Atheistic Teleology. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):5-19.
John A. Barker (1976). The Fallacy of Begging the Question. Dialogue 15 (02):241-255.
Roy A. Sorensen (1996). Unbeggable Questions. Analysis 56 (1):51–55.
D. A. Truncellito (2004). Running in Circles About Begging the Question. Argumentation 18 (3):325-329.
Allan Hazlett (2006). Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question. Erkenntnis 65 (3):343 - 363.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Begging the Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi (2005). Petitio Principii: What's Wrong? Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads22 ( #57,056 of 556,788 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,788 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
