Online research in philosophy

This is a revised edition of Walker's well-known book in feminist ethics first published in 1997. Walker's book proposes a view of morality and an approach to ethical theory which uses the critical insights of feminism and race theory to rethink the epistemological and moral position of the ethical theorist, and how moral theory is inescapably shaped by culture and history. The main gist of her book is that morality is embodied in "practices of responsibility" that express our identities, values, and connections to others in socially patterned ways. Thus ethical theory needs to be empirically informed and politically critical to avoid reiterating forms of socially entrenched bias. Responsible ethical theory should reveal and question the moral significance of social differences. The book engages with, and challenges, the work of contemporary analytic philosophers in ethics. Moral Understandings has been influential in reaching a global audience in ethics and feminist philosophy, as well as in tangential fields like nursing ethics; research ethics; disability ethics; environmental ethics, and social and political theory. This revised edition contains a new preface, a substantive postscript to Chapter 1 about "the subject of moral philosophy"; the addition of a new chapter on the importance of emotion in practices of responsibility; and the addition of an afterword, which responds to critics of the book.

Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is, roughly, the idea that some aspect of our responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. In this paper, I argue that (1) in spite of being an increasingly prevalent thread in discussions of moral responsibility, revisionism is poorly understood, (2) the limited critical discussion there has been of it does not reflect the complexities and nuances of revisionist theories, and (3) at least one species of revisionismmoderate revisionism- has some advantages over conventional compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. If I am right, one result is that the outcome of prominent debates about the compatibility (or not) of determinism and our commonsense thinking about moral responsibility may be less crucial than they seem.

In this paper I defend the claim that, contrary to common assumptions, a comparison between Adorno's and Wittgenstein's reflections on language is of use in the development of a linguistic transformation of Critical Theory. Wittgenstein's reflections can be brought into a fruitful dialogue with Adorno's remarks on the function of concepts. The concept of reification was for a long time the basic concept of a critical theory of society. Nowadays it seems to be discredited. Wittgenstein's approach to linguistic analysis makes it possible to use this concept in a new way.

This volumeincludes work from some of the most prominentcontemporary scholars in the humanities.

This paper proposes a lifespan developmental model of critical moral consciousness and examines its implications for education in childhood, adolescence and adulthood. Mature moral consciousness, central to negotiating the challenges of the 21st century, is characterized by a deepening lifelong integration of moral motivation, agency and critical discernment. The paper describes the evolution of moral consciousness through three levels; pre?critical consciousness (pCC), transitional critical consciousness (tCC) and critical consciousness (CC) and eight chronologically ascending psychosocial themes. It focuses on the first two periods and operationalizes the role of education in cultivating the four dimensions of moral motivation: a moral sense of identity, a sense of responsibility and agency, a deep sense of relatedness on all levels of living and a sense of meaning and life purpose. The paper proposes a re?envisioning of education in the direction of integrating mind and heart, developing both moral motivation and critical discernment and integrating these into optimal consciousness.

Learners who are first introduced to the process of critical thinking frequently experience a paradigm shift in their own thinking. However, such a major transition in one’s pattern of thinking may presentdifficulties when applying newly acquired critical thinking skills in social contexts. Learners may lack the confidence required for engaging in intellectual discourse, placing inhibitions on their using critical thinking. This article suggests several ways in which critical thinkers may more effectively and confidently use their skills in daily conversation.

In this paper I utilize Martin Beck Matuštík’s intellectual biography of Habermas as a means for reflecting on the meaning that criticaltheory has for us in the wake of September 11. I argue that the significant contribution of Matuštík’s book is that it fruitfully continues theconversation about the meaning of critical theory by underscoring the sociohistorical contexts that frame Habermas’s intellectual engagements. Matuštík’s figure of the critical theorist as witness refocuses attention on the critical theorist in context, nevertheless as critical theorists we also need to be mindful of the plurality of disastrous events that continue to shape our world.

This paper situates moral education in the context of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy and as embedded in lived experience qualified by three dimensions, namely critical, clinical, and creative ('3C'). The construct of '3C' education will be enriched by reference to the theoretical corpus of Nel Noddings, specifically her 2006 book Critical Lessons: What our schools should teach . The paper argues that only as embodying all three 'C's in experience can education become genuinely moral and bring the missing element of values into quality teaching (cf. Lovat, 2006a). The novel concept 'pedagogy of values' is proposed, analysed and synthesized alongside Deleuze's unorthodox 'pedagogy of the concept'.