Commitment, Types of Dialogue, and Fallacies

Informal Logic 14 (2):93-103 (1992)
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Abstract

This paper, based on research in a forthcoming monograph, Commitment in Dialogue, undertaken jointly with Erik Krabbe, explains several informal fallacies as shifts from one type of dialogue to another. The normative framework is that of a dialogue where two parties reason together, incurring and retracting commitments to various propositions as the dialogue continues. The fallacies studied include the ad hominem, the slippery slope, and many questions

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Author's Profile

Douglas Walton
Last affiliation: University of Windsor

Citations of this work

Refutation by Parallel Argument.André Juthe - 2008 - Argumentation 23 (2):133–169.
The Value of Genetic Fallacies.Andrew C. Ward - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (1):1-33.

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References found in this work

What's Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments?Trudy Govier - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):303 - 316.

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