David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 179 (3):377 - 407 (2011)
This paper argues that some traditional fallacies should be considered as reasonable arguments when used as part of a properly conducted dialog. It is shown that argumentation schemes, formal dialog models, and profiles of dialog are useful tools for studying properties of defeasible reasoning and fallacies. It is explained how defeasible reasoning of the most common sort can deteriorate into fallacious argumentation in some instances. Conditions are formulated that can be used as normative tools to judge whether a given defeasible argument is fallacious or not. It is shown that three leading violations of proper dialog standards for defeasible reasoning necessary to see how fallacies work are: (a) improper failure to retract a commitment, (b) failure of openness to defeat, and (c) illicit reversal of burden of proof
|Keywords||Fallacy theory Argumentation Argumentation schemes Formal dialog systems Burden of proof Evidence Profiles of dialog Artificial intelligence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
H. L. A. Hart (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno (2008). Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge University Press.
Douglas Walton & Erik C. W. Krabbe (1995). Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning. State University of New York Press.
C. L. Hamblin (1970/1993). Fallacies. Vale Press.
Thomas F. Gordon, Henry Prakken & Douglas N. Walton (2007). The Carneades Model of Argument and Burden of Proof. Artificial Intelligence 171 (10-15):875-896.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Timothy R. Colburn (1991). Defeasible Reasoning and Logic Programming. Minds and Machines 1 (4):417-436.
Graham Oppy (2004). Faulty Reasoning About Default Principles in Cosmological Arguments. Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):242-249.
Christopher W. Tindale (2007). Fallacies and Argument Appraisal. Cambridge University Press.
G. Aldo Antonelli (2005). Grounded Consequence for Defeasible Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Robert L. Causey (1991). The Epistemic Basis of Defeasible Reasoning. Minds and Machines 1 (4):437-458.
Robert A. Kowalski & Francesca Toni (1996). Abstract Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):275-296.
Floris Bex, Henry Prakken, Chris Reed & Douglas Walton (2003). Towards a Formal Account of Reasoning About Evidence: Argumentation Schemes and Generalisations. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):125-165.
Robert L. Causey (2003). Computational Dialogic Defeasible Reasoning. Argumentation 17 (4):421-450.
John L. Pollock (1991). Self-Defeating Arguments. Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.
Added to index2009-10-03
Total downloads39 ( #85,375 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?