Explanation, deliberation, and reasons
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):429–435 (2003)
| Abstract | Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality defends a strikingly nonpsychologistic account of motivating reasons for action. I agree wholeheartedly with Dancy that normative reasons do not in general consist in psychological states. I also agree with Dancy that motivating reasons should be understood in a way that preserves their connection to the kinds of normative consideration that recommend or speak in favor of actions. Despite these significant points of agreement, however, I find myself resisting Dancy’s nonpsychologistic conclusion. | |||||||||
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Donald C. Hubin (1999). Converging on Values. Analysis 59 (264):355–361.
Alfred Mele (2007). Reasonology and False Beliefs. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.
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Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
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