Everettian rationality: Defending Deutsch's approach to probability in the Everett interpretation

Abstract
An analysis is made of Deutsch's recent claim to have derived the Born rule from decision-theoretic assumptions. It is argued that Deutsch's proof must be understood in the explicit context of the Everett interpretation, and that in this context, it essentially succeeds. Some comments are made about the criticism of Deutsch's proof by Barnum, Caves, Finkelstein, Fuchs, and Schack; it is argued that the flaw which they point out in the proof does not apply if the Everett interpretation is assumed.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Meir Hemmo (2007). Quantum Probability and Many Worlds. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):333-350.
    David Baker (2007). Measurement Outcomes and Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (1):153-169.
    Fernando Birman (2009). Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):207-225.
    Hilary Greaves (2007). On the Everettian Epistemic Problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):120-152.

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