David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):305-331 (2006)
Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference.
|Keywords||human subjects animals animal subjects ethics guidelines moral status autonomy research protections respect for persons welfare justice capacities|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David J. Mellor (2009). The Sciences of Animal Welfare. Wiley-Blackwell.
Marc Bekoff (2007). Animals Matter: A Biologist Explains Why We Should Treat Animals with Compassion and Respect. Distributed in the United States by Random House.
S. F. Sapontzis (1988). On Justifying the Exploitation of Animals in Research. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (2):177-196.
Hope Ferdowsian (2011). Human and Animal Research Guidelines: Aligning Ethical Constructs with New Scientific Developments. Bioethics 25 (8):472-478.
Hon-Lam Li (2002). Animal Research, Non-Vegetarianism, and the Moral Status of Animals - Understanding the Impasse of the Animal Rights Problem. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (5):589 – 615.
Robert Bass (2012). Lives in the Balance: Utilitarianism and Animal Research. In Jeremy Garrett (ed.), The Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the Controversy. MIT Press.
Andrew Fenton (2012). On the Need to Redress an Inadequacy in Animal Welfare Science: Toward an Internally Coherent Framework. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):73-93.
Francine L. Dolins (ed.) (1999). Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare. Cambridge University Press.
Jeff McMahan (2005). “Our Fellow Creatures”. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):353 - 380.
Kelly Oliver (2010). Animal Ethics: Toward an Ethics of Responsiveness. Research in Phenomenology 40 (2):267-280.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #56,444 of 1,168,878 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #140,419 of 1,168,878 )
How can I increase my downloads?