Kierkegaard's concept of truthfulness

Inquiry 12 (1-4):209 – 224 (1969)
Kierkegaard claims that a certain kind of subjectivity (truthfulness) guarantees objectivity (truth). This paradox diminishes if we allow that he is concerned with the concept of truth involved in self?knowledge: ethical truth. Self?knowledge is an ethical concept, and close to the idea ?commitment to the truth?. Now this is analogous to the idea ?commitment to the Good?. And Kierkegaard claims also that a certain mode of willing guarantees its object's reality. This paradox diminishes if we reflect on the idea of faith. For there is a certain way of life which can be understood only as expressing commitment to the Good. Commitment to the Good is a form of the commitment of true love, agape. Agape and knowledge are connected. Kierkegaard claims that agape ?believes all? but ?is never deceived?. For knowledge is only of possibilities: and so belief is a choice that is up to us. Belief and mistrust are the only fundamental relationships between persons. Of these only belief is a truly ethical commitment. Thus only within ?the ethical? can the ideas of self?knowledge and truthfulness retain their full scope and application
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DOI 10.1080/00201746908601556
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Walter Lowrie (1957). On Authority and Revelation. Philosophical Review 66 (4):566-568.

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