Locked-in syndrome, bci, and a confusion about embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted cognition
Neuroethics 3 (1) (2010)
| Abstract | In a recent contribution to this journal, Andrew Fenton and Sheri Alpert have argued that the so-called “extended mind hypothesis” allows us to understand why Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) have the potential to change the self of patients suffering from Locked-in syndrome (LIS) by extending their minds beyond their bodies. I deny that this can shed any light on the theoretical, or philosophical, underpinnings of BCIs as a tool for enabling communication with, or bodily action by, patients with LIS: BCIs are not a case of cognitive extension. I argue that Fenton and Alpert’s claim to the contrary is the result of a widespread confusion about some related, but significantly different, approaches to cognition that all fall under the heading of “situated cognition.” I first provide a short taxonomy of various situated approaches to cognition, highlighting (some of) their important commonalities and differences, which should dissolve some of the confusions surrounding them. Then I show why the extended mind hypothesis is unsuitable as a model of BCI enhancements of LIS patients’ capacity to interact with their surroundings, and I argue that the situated approach with obvious bearings on the sort of questions that were driving Fenton and Alpert is not the idea that cognition is extended , but the idea that cognition is enacted. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRichard Heersmink (2009). Ghost in the Machine: A Philosophical Analysis of the Relationship Between Brain-Computer Interface Applications and Their Users. Dissertation, University of Twente.
Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Robert A. Wilson & Andy Clark (2009). How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take its Course. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge.
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
Richard Heersmink (2011). Embodied Tools, Cognitive Tools and Brain-Computer Interfaces. Neuroethics. DOI 10.1007/S12152-011-9136-2 6 (1):207-219.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-09-21Total downloads53 ( #19,858 of 556,803 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,010 of 556,803 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
