Moral conversion without moral realism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):129-137 (1992)
People occasionally change their moral beliefs and principles, and they may experience such changes as occurring independently of their wishes. Moral realists argue that this phenomenon of moral conversion is evidence for moral realism, and against noncognitivism. However, contemporary noncognitivists can acknowledge such changes--including changes "against our wills"--and can account for the changes in a simpler and more plausible manner. If moral realism posits real moral facts to account for moral conversion the result will be an extreme and untenable inflation of moral realist ontology
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00642.x
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press 181-228.
Rudolf Carnap (1963). The Development of My Thinking. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,Open Court 23--24.

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