David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 77 (2):147-171 (2010)
In evolutionary biology changes in population structure are explained by citing trait fitness distribution. I distinguish three interpretations of fitness explanations—the Two‐Factor Model, the Single‐Factor Model, and the Statistical Interpretation—and argue for the last of these. These interpretations differ in their degrees of causal commitment. The first two hold that trait fitness distribution causes population change. Trait fitness explanations, according to these interpretations, are causal explanations. The last maintains that trait fitness distribution correlates with population change but does not cause it. My defense of the Statistical Interpretation relies on a distinctive feature of causation. Causes conform to the Sure Thing Principle. Trait fitness distributions, I argue, do not. *Received July 2009; revised October 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy/Institute for the History, Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West, Toronto, ON M5S 1K7, Canada; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Arnon Levy (2013). Three Kinds of New Mechanism. Biology and Philosophy 28 (1):99-114.
Collin Rice (2015). Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation. Noûs 49 (3):589-615.
D. M. Walsh (2015). Variance, Invariance and Statistical Explanation. Erkenntnis 80 (3):469-489.
Philippe Huneman (2015). Inscrutability and the Opacity of Natural Selection and Random Genetic Drift: Distinguishing the Epistemic and Metaphysical Aspects. Erkenntnis 80 (3):491-518.
Charles H. Pence (forthcoming). Is Genetic Drift a Force? Synthese:1-22.
Similar books and articles
Andre Ariew (2009). What Fitness Can't Be. Erkenntnis 71 (3):289 - 301.
André Ariew & R. C. Lewontin (2004). The Confusions of Fitness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):347-363.
Henry Byerly (1986). Fitness as a Function. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:494 - 501.
Marshall Abrams (2009). The Unity of Fitness. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):750-761.
Frédéric Bouchard (2008). Causal Processes, Fitness, and the Differential Persistence of Lineages. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):560-570.
Susan K. Mills & John H. Beatty (1979). The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness. Philosophy of Science 46 (2):263-286.
D. M. Walsh (1996). Fitness and Function. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):553-574.
Marshall Abrams (2007). Fitness and Propensity's Annulment? Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):115-130.
Robert C. Richardson & Richard M. Burian (1992). A Defense of Propensity Interpretations of Fitness. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:349 - 362.
Jun Otsuka, Trin Turner, Colin Allen & Elisabeth Lloyd (2011). Why the Causal View of Fitness Survives. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):209-224.
Added to index2010-03-27
Total downloads107 ( #38,820 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #434,207 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?