Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):443-65 (1998)
|Abstract||This article questions social constructionists' claims to introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. The philosophical fiction of a neonate Crusoe is introduced to cast doubt on the interpretations and use of the private language argument to support a new psychology developed by the constructionists. It is argued that a neonate Crusoe's viability in philosophy and apparent absence in psychology offends against the integrity of the philosophical contribution Wittgenstein might make to psychology. The consequences of accepting Crusoe's viability are explored as they appear in both philosophy and psychology|
|Keywords||Argument Neonate Private Language Psychology Science Wittgenstein|
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