Omissions and other negative actions

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):305-324 (1980)
This essay offers an action-theoretic analysis of the distinction between positively bringing something about and passively letting something happen. The analysis, based on the notion of an agent''s bringing about some state of affairs, is closest to the analysis of omissions of Brand (1971), but utilizes the relatedness logic of Epstein (1979). Syntactic features bring out the idea that an action can be partially positive and partially negative, e.g., by not bringing about one thing an agent can bring about something else. An ethical implication of this analysis is that a passive course of action is sometimes less culpable than an active one, just because it is passive.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00882621
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1966). The Logical Form of Action Statements.". In Nicholas Rescher & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.), The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh]University of Pittsburgh Press

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

42 ( #113,494 of 1,932,522 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #46,286 of 1,932,522 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.