On composition as identity
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Some mereologists boast that their view of parts and wholes is ontologically innocent.[Lewis 1991: 72-87] They claim that a fusion is nothing over and above its parts; once you’ve committed to the parts, you get the fusion for free. In other words, fusions are not a further ontological commitment beyond the commitment to the parts. There are various proposals to explain how it is that fusions can come about so cheap. Perhaps the most straightforward of these explanations, and the one I will be concerned with in this paper, is to accept the Strong Composition Thesis:2, 3..
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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Brenner (2015). Mereological Nihilism and Theoretical Unification. Analytic Philosophy 56 (4):318-337.
Jeroen Smid (2015). The Ontological Parsimony of Mereology. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3253-3271.
Massimiliano Carrara & Giorgio Lando (2016). Composition, Indiscernibility, Coreferentiality. Erkenntnis 81 (1):119-142.
Meg Wallace (2014). The Argument From Vagueness for Modal Parts. Dialectica 68 (3):355-373.
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