David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination raises two sets of philosophical problems. First, there are questions about how deliberation can succeed in being practical in its issue. What do we need to assume — both about agents and about the processes of reasoning they engage in — to make sense of the fact that deliberative reflection can directly give rise to action? Can we do justice to this dimension of practical reason while preserving the idea that practical deliberation is genuinely a form of reasoning? Second, there are large issues concerning the content of the standards that are brought to bear in practical reasoning. Which norms for the assessment of action are binding on us as agents? Do these norms provide resources for critical reflection about our ends, or are they exclusively instrumental? Under what conditions do moral norms yield valid standards for reasoning about action? The first set of issues is addressed in sections 1-3 of the present article, while sections 4-5 cover the second set of issues.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian Kim (2014). The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals. Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Wayne Christensen (2012). Natural Sources of Normativity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):104-112.
Similar books and articles
R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.
Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.
Chrisoula Andreou (2005). The Voices of Reason. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
Onora O'Neill (2007). Normativity and Practical Judgement. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):393-405.
Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.
Bart Streumer (2010). Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell
Robert Audi (1989). Practical Reasoning. Routledge.
Alison Hills (2007). Practical Reason, Value and Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.
Pamela Hieronymi (2009). The Will as Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads102 ( #24,161 of 1,725,161 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #72,301 of 1,725,161 )
How can I increase my downloads?