David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 34 (3):355-376 (2006)
In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.
|Keywords||knowledge-based reasoning argument from ignorance burden of proof fallacy consistency of knowledge epistemic closure closed world assumption|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
João P. Martins & Maria R. Cravo (1991). How to Change Your Mind. Noûs 25 (4):537-551.
Douglas Walton (2011). Reasoning About Knowledge Using Defeasible Logic. Argument and Computation 2 (2-3):131 - 155.
Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
Christoph Kelp (2013). A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):367-383.
Rik Peels (2011). Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan. Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.
Pierre le Morvan (2011). Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief. Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson (2010). Assertion, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99 - 118.
Sinan Dogramaci (2010). Knowledge of Validity. Noûs 44 (3):403-432.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #129,339 of 1,410,405 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,872 of 1,410,405 )
How can I increase my downloads?