David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Hypatia 8 (3):61 - 83 (1993)
A traditional association of judgment with "reason" has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.
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Citations of this work BETA
Ruth Yeoman (2013). Conceptualising Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need. Journal of Business Ethics 125 (2):1-17.
Sami Pihlström (2007). Transcendental Guilt: On an Emotional Condition of Moral Experience. Journal of Religious Ethics 35 (1):87-111.
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