David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 33 (4):637-661 (2002)
This is a discussion of how we can understand the world-view given to us by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular the role played by the concept of 'world'. The view presented is that we are entitled to use 'many-worlds' terminology even if the theory does not specify the worlds in the formalism; this is defended by means of an extensive analogy with the concept of an 'instant' or moment of time in relativity, with the lack of a preferred foliation of spacetime being compared with the lack of a preferred basis in quantum theory. Implications for identity of worlds over time, and for relativistic quantum mechanics, are discussed.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
V. Allori, S. Goldstein, R. Tumulka & N. Zanghi (2011). Many Worlds and Schrodinger's First Quantum Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):1-27.
Lev Vaidman, Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Michael E. Cuffaro (2012). Many Worlds, the Cluster-State Quantum Computer, and the Problem of the Preferred Basis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (1):35-42.
Simon Saunders & D. Wallace (2008). Branching and Uncertainty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):293-305.
Howard Barnum, The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Psychological Versus Physical Bases for the Multiplicity of "Worlds".
David Baker (2007). Measurement Outcomes and Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (1):153-169.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #28,781 of 1,006,415 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #28,154 of 1,006,415 )
How can I increase my downloads?