From Mathematics to Philosophy

London (1974)
First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge
Keywords Computer  Logic  Mathematics  Metalogic  Mind  Set Theory
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Call number BD161.W27 1974
ISBN(s) 0391003356     9781315542164
DOI 10.2307/2217640
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