Is Implicit Theory of Mind the ‘Real Deal’? The Own‐Belief/True‐Belief Default in Adults and Young Preschoolers

Mind and Language 31 (2):147-176 (2016)
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Abstract

Recent studies reveal spontaneous implicit false-belief understanding in infancy. But is this early ability genuine theory-of-mind? Spontaneous tasks may allow early success by eliminating the selection-response bias thought to underlie later failure on standard tasks. However, using anticipatory eye gaze, we find the same bias in non-verbal tasks in both preschoolers and adults. We argue that the bias arises from theory-of-mind competence itself and takes the form of a rational prior to attribute one's own belief to others. Our discussion then draws attention to a number of other inferential hallmarks of early belief-desire reasoning that together suggest it is the real deal.

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