David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):66-69 (1999)
In recent years, the primary focus of many philosophers of mind has shifted to consciousness. And a growing number of philosophers, attempting to exploit some of the advances of the previous decade's work on intentionality, are advocating representational theories of consciousness. Representationalists have spent much time defending their characteristic thesis and have devoted much effort to some of the peculiar problems facing theories of consciousness . They have expended precious little energy answering more basic questions like ‘What makes a conscious state a conscious state?', ‘What conditions are necessary and sufficient for consciousness?', and ‘What can be said on behalf of the naturalization of consciousness?’ It is my suspicion, fuelled by the remarks of Armstrong, Lycan and Levine quoted in the paper, that representationalists have thought that these problems are solved if RT is correct. But this, I have argued, is a mistake. It's time for representationalists to address these issues
|Keywords||Consciousness History Metaphysics Mind Armstrong, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
David Jehle & Uriah Kriegel (2006). An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.
Similar books and articles
Guven Guzeldere (1995). Is Consciousness the Perception of What Passes in One's Own Mind? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh 335--357.
Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth W. Williford (eds.) (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
Ben L. Mijuskovic (1976). The Simplicity Argument Versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy Today 20 (4):292-305.
Andrew Brook (2006). Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press 89-109.
Michael Tye (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press
David Papineau (2003). Theories of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press 353.
William G. Lycan, Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #203,823 of 1,911,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #323,440 of 1,911,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?