Deprivation and the See-saw of Death

Abstract
Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus’s argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified.
Keywords death  deprivation account  Epicurus  ethics  hedonism  value of life
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PhilPapers Archive Christopher Wareham, Deprivation and the See-saw of Death
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