David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385 (2012)
I propose a novel solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction, one on which aspects of scientific methodology preclude significant confirmation of the Grue Hypothesis. The solution appeals to intuitive constraints on the confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, and can be construed as a fragment of a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non-methodological considerations, and those of Jackson, Godfrey-Smith, and White, on which explanatory considerations play a very different role
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Kowalenko (2012). Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
Adina L. Roskies (2008). Robustness and the New Riddle Revived. Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
Rosemarie Rheinwald (1993). An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
John D. Norton, The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.
John D. Norton (2006). How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207.
Nathan Stemmer (2007). Hume's Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill's Problem). Philosophical Studies 132 (2):137 - 159.
Daniel Steel, Mind Changes and Testability: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction.
Daniel Steel (2009). Testability and Ockham's Razor: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):471 - 489.
Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (2013). Explanation by Induction? Synthese 190 (3):509-524.
O. Schulte (2000). Discussion. What to Believe and What to Take Seriously: A Reply to David Chart Concerning the Riddle of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):151-153.
James Hawthorne (1993). Bayesian Induction IS Eliminative Induction. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
Added to index2012-02-01
Total downloads84 ( #19,408 of 1,679,329 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #39,396 of 1,679,329 )
How can I increase my downloads?