David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):262-282 (2010)
Abstract: In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's ‘voluntarist’ thesis, the idea—on Darwall's reading—that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non-voluntarily. He in turn defends a ‘presuppositional’ thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4–5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1–3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6–8)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Stephen L. Darwall (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
Paul Franks (2005). All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Nance (2015). Recognition, Freedom, and the Self in Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):608-632.
Similar books and articles
Hans-Jakob Wilhelm (1998). The 'I' and the Individual: The Problem of Nature in Fichte's Philosophy. Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
Allen W. Wood (2006). Fichte's Intersubjective I. Inquiry 49 (1):62 – 79.
David James (2011). Fichte's Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
James Alexander Clarke (2009). Fichte and Hegel on Recognition. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2):365-385.
Linda Radzik (2011). On Minding Your Own Business: Differentiating Accountability Relations Within the Moral Community. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):574-598.
Nedim Nomer (2010). Fichte and the Relationship Between Self-Positing and Rights. Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):469-490.
Amanda Roth (2010). Second-Personal Respect, the Experiential Aspect of Respect, and Feminist Philosophy. Hypatia 25 (2):316 - 333.
Stephen Darwall (2009). The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen Darwall. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):118-138.
Michael D. Barber (2008). Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the Second Person. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):629 – 644.
Added to index2009-03-24
Total downloads47 ( #89,995 of 1,907,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #464,819 of 1,907,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?