David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-208 (2002)
Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and thereductive Humean analyses that entail it leadsto a litany of inadequately explained conflictswith our intuitions regarding laws andpossibilities. However, the non-reductiveHumeanism developed here, on which law claimsare understood as normative rather than factstating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide aset of consistency relations that ground asemantics formulated in terms offactual-normative worlds, solving theFrege-Geach problem of construing unassertedcontexts. This set of factual-normative worldsincludes exactly the intuitive sets ofnomologically possible worlds associated witheach possible set of laws. The extension ofthe semantics to counterfactual and subjunctiveconditionals is sketched. Potential objectionsinvolving subjectivity, mind-dependence, andnon-factuality are discussed.
|Keywords||Laws Humeanism Humean Supervenience Counterfactuals Projectivism Expressivism Anti-Realism Explanation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender (2009). A Better Best System Account of Lawhood. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):1 - 34.
Mark Siderits (2014). Causation, 'Humean' Causation and Emptiness. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (4):433-449.
James Kreines (2004). Hegel's Critique of Pure Mechanism and the Philosophical Appeal of the Logic Project. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):38–74.
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