Identity

Philosophy Research Archives 10:353-382 (1984)
Abstract
This paper argues that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity through time of material objects where those conditions have a kind of empirical content necessary for them to function as criteria for identity through time. Taking Eli Hirsch’s program in The Concept of Identity as representative of attempts to formulate conditions which are logically necessary and sufficient and which also function as criteria guiding our tracing of objects’ careers through time, I argue (a) that, when such programs are constructed in a way sensitive to the criteria we actually use, they fall prey to conceivable counterexamples and (b) that, when such programs are tightened to avoid logically possible counterexamples, they fail to capture the identity criteria implicit in our ordinary experience. The paper argues that our identity criteria are incomplete and informal and that our individuative practice is partially determined by the kind of interest we have in the object(s) being traced. The relationship between this view and two versions of relative identity is also discussed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Leon Horsten (2010). Impredicative Identity Criteria. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):411-439.
Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):61-68.
Alan Sidelle (1995). A Semantic Account of Rigidity. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):69 - 105.
Katherine Hawley (2006). Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):481 – 493.
Laurance Splitter (2011). Identity, Citizenship and Moral Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (5):484-505.
Øystein Linnebo (2012). Reference by Abstraction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):45-71.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-12-02

Total downloads

13 ( #122,640 of 1,102,925 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #84,702 of 1,102,925 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.